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Abstract
The development and conceptual relationship of the constructs of threat appraisal (TA) and intolerance of
uncertainty (IU) are explored in the context of anxiety disorders. A narrative review tracking the development
of these constructs and their relationship is undertaken. There is some evidence to suggest that the interaction
between the components of threat appraisal (probability × cost) may partially account for or provide a
theoretical framework which explains presenting levels of anxiety. Furthermore, research suggested that IU
is a construct which contributes to a broad range of anxiety disorders. It was concluded that distinctive cognitive
biases linked with IU – such as interpreting ambiguous and uncertain (both positive and negative) information
as highly concerning – suggests that IU is interpreted negatively independent of threat appraisal. These findings
mean a number of issues remain unclear, including whether IU in anxiety-provoking situations is sufficient in
itself – independent of threat appraisal – in eliciting high levels of anxiety. Additionally, it is unclear whether
threat appraisal and IU act as independent constructs, or more in an interactive manner in anxiety. To achieve
further clarity on these issues, methodological recommendations for future research are made.
Key learning aims
(1) To understand the conceptual foundations of TA and IU in the cognitive model of anxiety.
(2) To understand the empirical evidence supporting the role of both TA and IU in anxiety.
(3) To appreciate the potential relationship between these concepts in anxiety.
Keywords: anxiety; intolerance of uncertainty; threat appraisal; uncertainty
Introduction
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has been found to be a separate construct to other frequently reported
dispositional characteristics of fear, such as anxiety sensitivity and illness sensitivity (Carleton et al.,
2014). It is also proposed to be distinct from anxiety (Carleton, 2012). Cognitive behavioural therapy
(CBT) has long established the key role of threat appraisal in anxiety; however, research into a more
newly established construct, that of IU, has largely concentrated on the contributions of trait IU to
anxiety. This has made it difficult to establish the nature of the conceptual relationship between IU and
threat appraisal in anxiety. Therefore, it seems important to determine their conceptual definitions and
track the evidence in support of them independently prior to considering their relationship. Clinically,
this would be important in terms of informing case conceptualization and treatments of anxiety. It is
acknowledged that there are other constructs which are clearly are important in the conceptualization
and experience of anxiety (including anxiety sensitivity, self-efficacy, distress tolerance and others), but
these two constructs were selected as they were felt to be key in current theoretical and clinical
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developments in our understanding and treatment of anxiety, and the others were beyond the scope of
the current review. In order to understand more fully each individual construct prior to considering
their potential relationship, the paper will firstly state the working definitions of IU and TA and then
outline the theoretical components of each construct.
Defining constructs
Fear and anxiety
Fear and anxiety are normal responses to the perceived dangerousness of certain situations that we all
experience on occasions, to different degrees of intensity. These emotional responses are elicited when
individuals are faced with danger, or threat, and motivate adaptive reactions to relieve the unpleasant
emotional state (Rosen and Schulkin, 1998). There is generally an accepted distinction made between
these responses. Fear is described as a response which quickly mobilizes protective reactions to direct
danger or life-threatening situations (Barlow, 2000), and therefore is an immediate defensive response
to identifiable threat (Barlow, 2002). By comparison, anxiety is described as an apprehensive emotional
response that is produced by the anticipation of potentially dangerous events in the absence of any
identifiable source (Beck et al., 1979; Rachman, 1990). Early cognitive accounts (Beck et al., 1985)
proposed that anxiety is an uncontrollable affective response dependent upon the interpretation of
a situation and the appraisal of a possible threat of negative events (i.e. negative outcomes), so it
is ‘the interpretation of a situation or stimulus as a sign of personal threat which is essential to
the experience of this emotion’ (Salkovskis, 1996; p. 50). At its core, the threat is uncertainty about
a possible danger, thus possible responses to this potential threat are preparatory rather than defensive.
Whilst anxiety is in many respects a normal and understandable response to potential threat, what
remains a puzzle clinically is the maintenance of dysfunctional, unhelpful and distressing anxiety. Two
key cognitive constructs that comprise our conceptualization of anxiety are threat appraisal (TA) and
intolerance of uncertainty (IU).
Threat appraisal
Early studies on the appraisal or perception of threat or danger suggested that this process is a key
component in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Butler and Mathews, 1983;
Carr, 1974). TA is defined as an individual’s interpretationof both theprobability and severity of a future
negative event occurring (Carr, 1974). It has been proposed that anxiety develops due to errors in the
judgements or decision-making in terms of appraisal of the threat. This includes: the over-estimation of
the probability of a dangerous incident occurring; an over-estimation of the negative impact or
severity this event would result in if it actually happened; and an under-estimation of the coping
resources and available rescue factors (Beck et al., 1985; Salkovskis, 1996). From this perspective,
maladaptive orunhelpful anxiety is anticipatory innature: it involves complex cognitiveprocesses linked
with the over-estimationof threat inherent in a given situation, and estimations of insufficient efficacy to
cope with the potential situation.
Intolerance of uncertainty
Theoretically, it is proposed that an inability to tolerate uncertainty associated with unknown
outcomes plays a role in the development and maintenance of clinically significant anxiety
(Dugas et al., 1998; Freeston et al., 1994). Within this early conceptualization, it is not the
misappraisal of a situation that is seen as problematic; rather, it is that elements of a situation
are uncertain, and this is experienced as difficult to tolerate. A recent review of IU’s conceptual
foundations highlighted the ongoing evolving nature of the IU literature and its associated
definitions (Shihata et al., 2016). Whilst IU was originally defined as a broad construct, according
to Shihata et al. (2016; p. 116) the current consensus describes IU as a ‘dispositional characteristic
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that reflects a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications’ (Dugas and Robichaud,
2007), and represents an underlying fear of the unknown (Carleton, 2016). This implies that
uncertainty is aversive, and the fear of not knowing may lead to more negative beliefs about
the possible outcomes of uncertain situations. Additionally, Shihata et al. (2016) focused on a
further definition of IU which described this concept as an ‘incapacity to endure the aversive
response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient information’
(Carleton, 2016; p. 31). This describes how reactions to IU are experienced very negatively, which
in itself could enable a threat response. From these recent reviews, it appears that IU itself is
aversive and threatening and it is this experience which contributes to significant anxiety; it
may also be that this aversion to IU plays an influential role in the estimation of threat appraisals.
However, IU remains a broadly defined construct with multiple co-existing definitions
(Carleton, 2012), although it is proposed that at its core, IU represents fear of the unknown.
Relationship between threat appraisal and intolerance of uncertainty
Although TA and IU both appear to be closely related to anxiety, the potential theoretical relationship
between these concepts in anxiety has not yet been explored. In the literature, there are many implicit
links made between the constructs of IU and threat appraisal within our understanding of anxiety.
However, most studies have not attempted to explore the relationship between the two constructs.
Some researchers hypothesize that the construct of IU may simply be another form of TA, so the
independence of the two constructs requires examination. Whilst the literature relating to TA has
focused primarily on our estimations of subjective personal risk and the clinical utility of re-appraising
over-estimations of threat, the IU literature appears much broader, exploratory in nature, with many
studies looking at proof of the concept of IU itself, as well as the implications of these concepts located
within both clinical and analogue samples. To consider the conceptual relationship between TA and
IU, it is important to trace the changing theoretical developments within these two bodies of literature,
prior to considering the conceptual relationship between these two constructs. It is anticipated that this
will help to establish a clearer understanding of the conceptual foundations of each construct, and
consider the evidence to support the contribution of both concepts to understanding anxiety.
Method
This review used a mixed methodology, employing systematic search techniques with a narrative
method to synthesize the information. It was judged that the disjointed and fragmented nature of
the literature required a narrative style for the review in order to synthesize different areas of
knowledge and parts of the literature to better understand and integrate these areas.
Employing only systematic searches using key terms may have resulted in the omission of relevant
papers, as many of the constructs of interest may not appear in titles, abstracts or words. A range
of strategies were therefore used and are described below. To help increase transparency and
trustworthiness of this approach, complementary tools were used which included systematic
searching to identify papers, extraction and summarizing of information from papers guided
by theory, grouping of information in terms of similarities and differences, and critical reflection
to build in steps to review the quality of data and guard against bias. These processes assisted with
synthesizing the findings to enable drawing together of new interpretations and conclusions about
the literature.
A range of electronic databases (MEDLINE, Embase, PsychINFO andWeb of Knowledge) were
used in the review to ensure a broad range of sources was captured via the search terms. Key terms
were derived from key papers and database directory of terms (e.g. perceived threat). The review
included a combination of peer-reviewed journals, books and grey literature. Searches were not
limited by date or study type. Clinical and analogue populations were included in the search.
Supplemental hand searches were conducted in order to follow up references from previously
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identified studies. Additional searches were conducted on named authors who, through the
process of searching, were identified as key authors in the fields. Further articles were identified
through citation searches for key articles. Tracking this literature forwards increased the likelihood
of ensuring suitable searching of the field.
In terms of specifically identifying appropriate literature from the searches to include in the
narrative review of the evidence base for the theoretical concepts of TA and IU, the selection criteria
described below was used to determine what studies were applicable to this aim of the narrative review.
Firstly, to ensure studies included measured and analysed any of the components of IU or TA, but
threat was included only under the condition of appraisal (estimations of a situation or a stimulus at a
cognitive level) rather than behavioural reaction (reaction to a present of possible threat, e.g. an electric
shock). Secondly, to ensure that the reviewed studies were examining the key theoretical dimensions of
the specific concepts of interest. For example, in the case of TA, this meant that studies were measuring
and analysing data described in the theoretical framework of threat appraisal (either singular, or
multiple components, which include estimates of probability, cost and coping) rather than threat
as an overall term. Similarly, in terms of IU, it was important that studies were measuring and
analysing data using a specific measurement of IU at either a dispositional or situational level.
In order to assess the quality of the literature within this narrative review, firstly studies meeting the
criteria for inclusion were summarized in a data extraction phase that involved: locating relevant data
in the text, extracting these data from studies into a brief summary description of the sample, relevant
methods or measurements, key findings and implications. A second step in this was identifying the
quality of the measurement of the theoretical concepts (TA or IU), which included assessing construct
validity through identifying whether studies had included theoretical precedent in describing and
measuring the concepts, and also whether there was a record of attempts to account for construct
validity. Initial grouping and clustering aided the processes of description and synthesis by looking
for patterns across groups of studies. Secondly, after grouping the studies it was possible to summarize
the relationships within and between studies given the variability in study design (e.g. experimental,
cross-sectional), and the over-arching design (e.g. in terms of populations with different anxiety
disorders, trait versus situational measures).
Results
Theoretical development of the construct of threat appraisal
Carr (1974) was the first author to describe the components of TA as a process of ‘an individual’s
evaluation of a situation in terms of its harmful implications’ (Carr, 1974; p. 315). According to this
definition, the degree of harm implied by a situation is dependent upon not only an individual’s
estimates of the subjective probability and unpleasantness of harm occurring, but also the
‘multiplicative’ interaction of these variables. Carr (1974) was informed in the development of this
framework by recent psychophysiological research which suggested that obsessive compulsive disorder
(OCD) patients made elevated subjective probability judgements of negative outcomes (Carr, 1971),
and by the stress appraisal model of Lazarus (1966).
Carr (1974) suggested that OCD symptomology is an anxiety management response to TA, and
proposed that compulsive symptoms in particular appeared to be a reaction to threat. This added
explanatory value to these behaviours which, until that point had been considered a very difficult
problem for both clinicians and researchers to understand and treat (see review by Rachman,
2015). The framework of TA proposed that in OCD compulsions develop as way to reduce threat,
in particular to lower the probability of awful or catastrophic outcomes. The framework acknowledged
the limitations of the conceptualization in terms of its inability to explain why people with
compulsions actually did over-estimate the probability of future negative events occurring.
Nevertheless, proposing these central features of the TA framework had significant clinical
implications in terms of opening new avenues for treatment approaches to address threat
misappraisals.
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Beck’s contributions (Beck, 1970; Beck et al., 1979) through the cognitive approach to the
treatment of depression also had a profound impact on the developing understanding of anxiety
disorders, and led to researchers and clinicians using cognitive models to understand anxiety.
Building on his early observations that depression was associated with loss, and anxiety was
associated with threat (Beck, 1976), now recognised as the cognitive specificity hypothesis, Beck
et al. (1985) detailed a theoretical account of anxiety. This hypothesis proposed that individual
cognitive sets (including previous learning experiences, personal memories, personal interests,
and predisposition) are influential in determining the manner in which a person extracts
information and forms an initial impression, including TA, about a given situation. Beck et al.
(1985) did not only advocate the process whereby appraisal of threat occurs, but they extended
the understanding by introducing the idea of the impact of an individual’s idiosyncratic
experiences on this cognitive conceptual process. Similar to Carr, they also suggested that the
degree of anxiety an individual experiences is dependent not on one individual component of this
process, but the overall estimation reached through a process of initial appraisal of severity and
probability of potential danger, alongside judgements about abilities to buffer this danger utilizing
coping resources. For Beck et al. (1985), the relationship between TA components was similar to
Carr’s (1974) proposal. Threat appraisal was proposed to be dependent on ‘computating’ (Beck
et al., 1985; p. 42) the perceived severity of the danger, the probability of it occurring and
the individual’s coping resources, which produced a final analysis about the degree of
perceived damage expected. Consequently, responses are then proportional and dependent on this
overall evaluation.
The work of Beck et al. was influential in emphasizing that it is the meaning that people attach
to events, and the impact of their own previous experiences, which are viewed as instrumental in
the interpretation of situations, rather than the situation itself. This was significant to the
development of the construct of TA, as it emphasizes the complexity of the variables influencing
threat appraisal, mainly through the introduction of the interplay between an individual cognitive
set, the situation and threat appraisal components.
The threat appraisal equation
Following the work of Carr (1974) and Beck et al. (1985), a further description of TA by Salkovskis
(1996) emphasized that the appraisal, or interpretation, of threat is the key to our understanding
of anxiety (Salkovskis, 1996). In part a synthesis of Beck’s writing on cognition and anxiety
(Beck et al., 1985), Salkovskis (1996) explicitly proposed an interactivity rather than additivity
between perceived probability and perceived cost. Informed by clinical observations that if the
interpretation of the perceived awfulness or cost of the appraisal could be directly reduced such
as through the use of behavioural experiments, the individual’s probability estimate could be vastly
reduced without any direct therapeutic intervention specifically for overestimation of probability
(P. Salkovskis, personal communication, 13 January 2016). Salkovskis viewed TA as the subjective
appraisal of the probability of danger interacting with the subjective perceived awfulness of the
potential danger, mitigated by the perception of coping ability and ability to access external
resources if required, termed the threat appraisal equation (Fig. 1). As with Beck et al. (1985),
Salkovskis regarded the appraisal of potential personal resources to cope with threat as part of
TA rather than a separate process.
Figure 1. Threat appraisal equation.
Adapted from Frontiers of Cognitive
Therapy by P. Salkovskis (1996, p. 53), with
permission.
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Although the components in Salkovskis’ equation had each been described previously in the
literature (e.g. Beck et al., 1985; Carr, 1974), this framework demonstrated the importance of the
multiplicative relationship between primary appraisal components (likelihood of danger ×
awfulness), rather than an additive relationship. As such it was an important development in
our understanding about the relationship between components of threat. Although aware of
Carr’s (1974) paper, which also suggests a ‘multiplicative’ relationship between probability and
cost components, this did not directly inform writing of the equation (P. Salkovskis, personal
communication, 13 January 2016). The coping component of this framework drew conceptually
from the works of Lazarus and Folkman (1966), and Bandura (1981), which emphasized that
judgements about coping are based on beliefs about the extent to which the individual feels they
can change their environment, and how much this capacity is perceived to be within their control.
Few studies have theoretically tested the entire framework as a ‘multiplicative’ equation
although some have investigated the different contributions of the individual components.
There is a body of evidence which shows a differential role of the two key components in the
primary appraisal of threat, with reported perceived probability and cost levels varying across
different anxious presentations (e.g. Poulton and Andrews, 1996; Uren et al., 2004; Smits
et al., 2006). A smaller number of studies have investigated the role of both components together
of the primary appraisal process, and the relationship between them, using specific questionnaire-
based measures developed to operationalize the model. An exploratory study by Butler and
Mathews (1983) was one of the first studies to experimentally examine the proposition that people
with anxiety will make higher threat appraisals. Using Carr’s (1974) framework, they developed a
measure of cost and probability estimations, of future-orientated aversive events, and computed
the interaction between these variables (cost × probability) to test whether anxious patients made
higher appraisals of threat. They asked small groups (n= 12) of individuals diagnosed with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and major depressive disorder with a benchmarking control
group to rate cost estimates of a series of negative events, and to rate the perceived probability of
both negative and positive events, in relation to both themselves and also others. They found
significantly increased appraisals of probability and cost for negative threatening events amongst
the anxious group and the depressed group (who almost met clinical caseness for anxiety),
compared with the control group. They further identified a relationship between anxiety and
the elevated estimation of personal risk amongst anxious populations only, which differed from
the more pervasive appraisals made by the depressed group. For the multiplicative variable of
threat appraisal (probability × cost), the overall threat score for the clinical groups was
significantly higher than for the control group.
A more direct test of the multiplicative relationship of cost and probability was undertaken by
Freeston et al. (1994) who recruited an analogue sample from general hospital waiting rooms, all
of whom reported experiencing at least one health-related intrusive thought over the past month.
The threat appraisal components, although based on Carr’s (1974) framework, were adapted to
the appraisal of health-related intrusive thoughts. This study showed that both the specific
probability and cost appraisal ratings accounted significantly for variance in worry, and related
to difficulties in removing intrusive worrying thoughts. When the multiplicative components were
added later in the hierarchical regression after the singular components of threat appraisal
(probability and cost), the multiplicative or interaction threat term still accounted for significant
additional variance in worry. The findings support the position that the singular TA terms and the
interaction between them are closely linked to anxiety, and they suggest that adding the
interaction term may improve the strength of the appraisal model. In a further study on worry
by Berenbaum et al. (2007), these authors found that the interaction term accounted for 2% above
the independent effects of the individual components (cost and probability). Worry was associated
with the interaction of appraisal components, and this interaction added a unique contribution
beyond the independent components.
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As noted previously, a theoretical elaboration by Beck et al. (1985) and synthesis by Salkovskis
(1996) proposed that TA includes secondary, coping appraisal components. Partial support for the
proposal that lower estimates of coping resources impacts upon or mitigates the critical response
to the appraisal of likelihood of severity and costly negative outcomes was found in a study by
Woods et al. (2002) who attempted to operationalize Salkovskis’ (1996) equation, measuring
and computing all components except the rescue variable. They utilized a semi-idiosyncratic
measure to examine TA components in a group of individuals diagnosed with OCD (n= 18)
and a non-clinical benchmarking group (n= 72). In the sample of OCD patients, no relationship
between threat appraisal components and subsequent OCD symptoms were identified. The only
variable that contributed significantly to the prediction of anxiety symptoms in the clinical sample
was a low estimation of their ability to cope. In comparison, only the probability estimation of a
negative outcome contributed to the prediction of symptoms of anxiety in the analogue sample.
Whilst acknowledging the small sample sizes in this study, the results provide some support for
the claim that lower perceived ability to cope may impact on the overall anxiety response during
the appraisal processes of a future possible threat.
Treatment models incorporating the threat appraisal equation
Cognitive models of anxiety propose that the focus of CBT should be the re-appraisal of threat
components in order to allow the re-evaluation of beliefs and hence ultimately reduce anxiety
symptoms (e.g. Clark, 1986; Salkovskis, 1996). In support of this focus of treatment, there are
studies which have found that threat re-appraisal is associated with a reduction in anxiety
symptoms after CBT treatment (e.g. McNally and Foa, 1987; Smits et al., 2006). However, the
inconsistencies across studies to test necessary criteria for causality have made it difficult to
conclude definitively that threat re-appraisal is the main driver or active ingredient of symptom
improvements (e.g. see systematic review by Smits et al., 2012). Thus although a reduction in the
appraisal of probability and cost estimates infers a relationship between threat appraisal and
anxiety symptoms, further and more rigorous testing is needed to determine if threat re-appraisal
acts as the key change mechanism.
While the role of threat appraisal components (cost and probability) in anxiety have been identified,
it is unclear if these variables act as triggers, or whether they act to perpetuate or maintain anxiety
alongside other appraisal variables. The evidence to date does not eliminate the idea that these
components could act in a causal way to lead to anxiety; however, further stringent tests of this model
are needed to provide better justification for a rationale which reaches beyond the identified significant
correlational relationship of probability and their interaction, to one of causation. The main findings
suggest that the interactivity between probability and cost estimates may add additional predictive
value in understanding anxiety rather than simply considering the singular or additive role of these
processes. There is some evidence to suggest that coping efficacy (or lack thereof) is related to the level
of anxiety; this is an important consideration within the cognitive appraisal model. However, research
investigating the role of the coping appraisal process remains limited.
Clinically, one to two key dysfunctional cognitions or beliefs that are believed to be maintaining the
unhelpful or incorrect assumptions about the world, the self or others are often targeted in CBT
treatment for anxiety. The threat equation detailing subjective probability × subjective cost suggests
that the level of harm implied in a situation is a result of the interaction of these threat elements. Carr
et al. (1974) outlined how individuals struggling with OCD often make high subjective estimates of the
probability of undesired outcomes and therefore utilize compulsive behaviours to reduce the perceived
likelihood of the threatening outcomes occurring. However, individuals with OCD do not use
compulsive behaviours in relation to every probable negative situation. Rather, it is suggested that
where high cost estimates interact with pre-existing high probability estimates that this produces a
high level of threat, necessitating threat reducing behaviour, e.g. compulsions (Carr et al., 1974).
In this framework the compulsive behaviours in OCD are perceived (incorrectly) as the most effective
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way to reduce the probability of an awful outcome happening. For example, where there is a belief that
one is very likely to pass on a terrible infection to a young child through touch (high probability
estimate and high evaluation of a negative outcome), extensive hand-washing rituals may be employed
(to reduce the probability of the awful event occurring). The chosen strategy lowers the perceived
threat level, which lowers the individual’s anxiety and thus reinforces the hand-washing behaviour.
In such a case, interventions such as exposure and response prevention may be promoted to enable
a client to tolerate reducing rituals in order to demonstrate that the feared event does not happen and/
or that the individual can tolerate the discomfort of not responding to the threat through rituals. This
model proposes that clinicians treating anxiety should not only be curious about subjective probability
estimates, but also ensure specific predictions are elicited about the consequences of a situation, if they
are to be successful in targeting the most acute symptoms.
Theoretical development of the construct of intolerance of uncertainty
The construct of IU originated in clinical observations of patients with GAD, as Freeston et al.
(1994) noted that some individuals appeared to perceive uncertain elements of situations as
threatening, and it seemed that it was the ‘not knowing’ with regard to uncertain events which
underlined experiences of worry in clients. It was noted that, for some individuals who were highly
intolerant of uncertainty, their appraisal or perception of threat was increased even in the absence
of objective risk, difficulties or danger. This led to a proposed conceptual model of GAD which
placed IU as a core feature underlining and intensifying features of GAD (Dugas et al., 1998).
Although the development of IU was originally associated with GAD (Freeston et al., 1994),
subsequent research has demonstrated that it is an important construct beyond this disorder
implicated in many clinical presentations. Studies have found IU to be associated with symptoms
of other emotional disorders, including various anxiety disorders such as OCD, social anxiety,
health anxiety Boelen and Reijntjes, 2009; Gentes and Ruscio, 2011; (Steketee et al., 1998), as well
as other disorders such as depression (Miranda et al., 2008) and eating disorders (Brown et al.,
2017). Therefore, IU can be considered to be impacting on a range of transdiagnostic difficulties
rather than being a disorder-specific construct.
While earlier research tended to examine levels of IU in clinically defined groups, later emerging
studies sought to establish the composition and nature of this construct. Although original definitions
of IU had been vague and evolving, the study by Birrell et al. (2011) provided evidence that IU is one
construct with distinct components. The systematic review established that IU consists of two distinct
and stable factors: the desire for predictability, and paralysis of cognition and action in the face of
uncertainty (Birrell et al., 2011; p. 1998). Further to this, a taxometric analysis of IU by Carleton
et al. (2012) concluded that IU acts more like a dimensional than a categorical construct. Various
studies support this conclusion. For example, data from undergraduate samples indicate a strong
association between IU and social anxiety (Carleton et al., 2010). This evidence indicates that IU
may be conceptualized as a continuous construct, varying in degrees from non-clinical to clinical
populations and therefore is applicable to people in everyday life situations.
A recent literature synthesis by Carleton (2016) suggested that IU may underpin anxiety,
describing the ‘fear of the unknown maybe a, or possibly the, fundamental fear’ (p. 39).
Previous studies have shown that IU robustly contributes to anxiety even after controlling for
other fundamental fears which are significant predictors of anxiety, for example neuroticism,
anxiety sensitivity, and positive and negative affect (Carleton et al., 2007a, b; Carleton et al.,
2014; McEvoy andMahoney, 2011). This conceptualization suggests that IU may underlie anxiety,
and the evidence indicates that IU’s contribution is independent of other core fear-related
constructs.
However, currently the understanding of the pathways through which IU both elevates and
maintains anxiety is as yet a less well understood area. In contrast to the longstanding and
well-established accepted models of threat appraisal in anxiety (e.g. Clark, 1999), there are only
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a small number of papers which have modelled IU as a feature in anxiety through taking a trans-
diagnostic view of anxiety rather than disorder-specific (Einstein, 2014; Grupe and Nitsche, 2013).
Grupe and Nitsche (2013) proposed an integrated neurobiological and psychological model of
anxiety with a focus on anticipatory responding to uncertainty. They identify five processes which
under maladaptive control account for anxiety, including inflated estimates of threat cost and
probability, increased attention to threat and hyper-vigilance, deficient safety learning,
behavioural and cognitive avoidance, and heightened reactivity to threat and uncertainty. The
presented evidence suggests that unhelpful or dysfunctional anxiety associated with uncertainty
around a potential threat is central to anxiety at both a clinical and sub-clinical level. Within this
model the neural basis of heightened reactivity to uncertainty is seen as separate but related to
processes to inflated estimates of threat cost and probability. Einstein’s (2014) transdiagnostic
model, in contrast, suggests that IU only contributes to anxiety in the presence of elevated threat
appraisal. This model proposes that where individuals are faced with uncertainty they make
elevated threat estimations linked with aversive possible outcomes. Within this model, uncertainty
in the context of threat estimations is aversive, and not uncertainty in and of itself. This view sits
in opposition to the conceptualization of IU as ‘fear of the unknown maybe a, or possibly the,
fundamental fear’ (Carleton, 2016) and the evidence which suggests that IU may contribute
independently to anxiety. Although there has been increasing interest in the role of IU in the
development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms there are therefore discrepant conceptual
views around the ability of the concept of IU to account for the onset and maintenance of anxiety
independently of threat estimations.
Theoretically, higher levels of dispositional or trait IU are proposed to impact negatively on
cognitive processing under conditions of uncertainty (Buhr and Dugas, 2002). There is evidence
from correlational studies showing that clinical populations and non-clinical populations who
score higher on measures of trait IU also score higher on symptom measures of anxiety
(e.g. Freeston et al., 1994; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a; Tolin et al., 2003). Given the early stages
of the literature in modelling the contribution of IU in anxiety there is a requirement for further
efforts to disentangle the relationship between TA and IU in anxiety which would help to clarify
IU’s contribution to anxiety independently of TA.
Evidence for the role of intolerance of uncertainty in anxiety
Experimental tasks have investigated the association between an individual’s threshold of ability to
tolerate uncertainty and the evaluation of aspects of an uncertain event. Ladouceur et al. (2000)
developed a gambling task to experimentally manipulate IU in a non-clinical group. The group in
the higher IU condition demonstrated higher levels of worry compared with the group in the
lower IU condition on this task. This study was the first to demonstrate the negative impact
of IU on cognitive processes (increased worry) and provided evidence consistent with the
proposed IU model of GAD. A further series of studies has demonstrated that higher levels of
uncertainty guides processing and contributes to the manifestation of worry (Koerner and
Dugas, 2008; Ladouceur et al., 1997). Given the strength of the relationship with worry, studies
investigated a possible casual role in social anxiety and health anxiety-provoking tasks, with results
demonstrating a similar trend (Carleton et al., 2010; Rosen and Knauper, 2009). This evidence
supported a transdiagnostic view of IU as the studies demonstrate a link between levels of IU,
changes in cognitive processes and experiences of anxiety relative to levels of uncertainty.
The described studies demonstrate evidence of an association between the manipulation of IU
and changes in anxiety symptoms. In the recent literature, efforts have been made to investigate
the mechanisms by which IU may contribute to anxiety. Mahoney and McEvoy (2012b) carried
out a study to explore the indirect effects of IU across a range of clinical anxiety disorders. IU was
found to account for unique variance in all specific symptommeasures, and partially mediated the
relationship between neuroticism and symptom measures. This evidence supports IU as a
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common factor across anxiety disorders, and in terms of its positioning in theoretical frameworks,
the authors suggest that IU may be a lower-order cognitive factor influencing the relationship
between personality variables and symptoms of anxiety. Although other anxiety constructs
(e.g. anxiety sensitivity) were not included in the analysis, there is evidence to suggest that IU
may contribute to anxiety beyond other core fear constructs (Carleton et al., 2014). The authors
suggest IU as a construct is perhaps contributing to anxiety symptoms through its relationship
with high-order constructs (e.g. neuroticism).
Further enquiry into the mechanisms by which IU may have an impact on anxiety has
considered the circumstances likely to activate this construct. Studies show that individuals high
in IU may interpret information under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity in a more
threatening manner. In clinical samples, it has been shown that anxious populations rate
ambiguous situations (e.g. using vignettes such as ‘you wake in the middle of the night, you think
you have heard something but all is quiet’) as highly threatening (Butler and Mathews, 1983) and
more concerning in comparison with non-ambiguous positive and negative situations (Anderson
et al., 2012). These negative interpretation biases towards ambiguous situations have been shown
in samples of individuals higher in trait levels of IU than those comparatively lower in trait IU
(Dugas et al., 2005). A further study by Koerner and Dugas (2008) found a similar relationship
between level of trait IU (high and low groups) and rating on ambiguous situations in an analogue
sample. In this study, the high trait IU group rated all situations more negatively; however,
between the low and high trait IU groups, there was only a significant group effect for the
ambiguous situations. A more recent vignette-based study by Reuman et al. (2015) found that
uncertain and threatening scenarios that had more explicit uncertainty provoked a higher rating
of anxiety than situations in which uncertainty was more implicit. These results demonstrate
that tolerance levels for uncertainty play an instrumental role in the negative interpretation of
ambiguous situations, rather than unambiguous situations. Thus, IU may play a role in elevating
threatening interpretations of uncertain situations and increasing negative reactions to uncertain
outcomes.
However, a limitation across these studies is the lack of clear differentiation between ambiguity
and uncertainty measures. It is proposed that IU is future orientated, whereas intolerance of
ambiguity (IA) is concerned with unclear situations interpretable in the ‘here and now’
(Grenier et al., 2005). IU has been shown to continue to predict variance in worry after other
constructs, including IA, have been added to regression analysis. It may be concluded from
the evidence that individuals higher in dispositional IU are more likely to experience negative
anxious affect in response to ambiguity or uncertainty (Koerner and Dugas, 2008). These findings
suggest that IU leads to a perception of threat, yet whether IU is contributing to anxiety over and
above threat appraisals is not known, as this has not yet been empirically tested.
In addition to IU measured at a dispositional level, recent studies have begun to investigate the
impact of uncertainty in situations, and findings suggest that intolerance to uncertainty at a
situational level accounts for significant variance in anxiety symptom measures. Mahoney and
McEvoy (2012a) developed and tested a new specific situational measure of IU (IUS-SS) in a
sample of individuals diagnosed with clinical levels of anxiety and found that situational
uncertainty – as opposed to the dispositional measure of IU – was reported more in the anxiety
group than in the benchmarking control group. Over and above the IUmeasured at a dispositional
level, situational uncertainty accounted for variance in anxiety symptom measures. This indicates
that difficulty tolerating uncertainty in situations is closely related to negative affect experienced,
and this may be more predictive of situation-specific anxiety than IU measured at a dispositional
level. This illustrates that situational IU may be contributing significantly to presentations of
anxiety. However, as with previous studies, this measure was based on ambiguous rather than
uncertain scenarios, and hence the conceptual clarity is unclear.
An unpublished study has resolved some of the conceptual criticism in its exploration of the
cognitive, behavioural and emotional appraisals of uncertain situations in a group of non-clinical
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adolescent participants. In the design stage of this study, M. Ford (unpublished doctoral thesis,
2011) distinguished uncertainty and ambiguity in measure development, to ensure only the
inclusion of uncertain situations. It was found that participants’ levels of trait IU were significantly
impacted on by appraisal of arousal in situational IU. The measure of appraisal of affect
and arousal together explained 23.8% variance in IU – over and above the appraisal of the
‘unpleasantness of the situation’, which was based on threat appraisal items (e.g. likelihood of
awful outcome, severity of this outcome). This showed that increases in trait IU in uncertain
situations appear to be accounted for by the evoked internal arousal which was interpreted
negatively; this contribution was over and above the situation appraisal which was inclusive of
estimations of threat. IU may therefore be linked with emotional experiences of uncertain stimuli
that are aversive, and this may be independent of threat appraisal. This finding adds to the
understanding of why uncertainty may be so intolerable through investigating various appraisals
of uncertainty; however, the findings are limited in generalizability as an adolescent population
only was used.
A more recent study by Pepperdine et al. (2018) clearly distinguished between IU and
intolerance of ambiguity using a vignette-based measure to look at the role of situational IU
in predicting dispositional IU. Findings showed situational IU predisposed participants to see
more threat in uncertain situations with a potentially negative outcome, a neutral outcome
and even, in uncertain situations with a potential positive outcome. Situational IU was found
to be bothersome across all situations even when threat appraisal was controlled for, and this
intolerance to uncertainty in the situation contributed unique variance to IU at a dispositional
level. Pepperdine et al. (2018) for the first time clearly separated between threat and IU in
personally salient but non-threatening situations. This provides evidence of the relative
independence of IU and TA, as uncertainty was still bothersome even in positive situations
(where there is not direct possible negative outcome). However, it is unclear how in salient
anxiety-specific situations whether these two concepts would relate or inter-relate with one
another, or whether they would operate as relatively independent constructs in anxiety.
Clinically, these data suggest that the ‘not-knowing’ component of a situation is difficult for people
high in IU to tolerate and that it is important to reduce this bothersome and negative
experience. Crucially, this can occur independently of threat (i.e. a probable negative outcome).
However, we do not know if the bothersomeness of IU in possible negative situations may inflate
subjective threat estimates. An example may be seen in social anxiety and interactions with
others – such as, if an individual is uncertain how theymay look asking a question and they are bothered
by this uncertainty, this negative experience of IU could lead them to make a greater over-estimation
of threat (e.g. I am not sure howmy question will sound to others, I don’t like not knowing, this doesn’t
feel ok> it is extremely likely that I am going to look stupid which will be humiliating and shameful).
Although there is no evidence at present of this relationship between IU and TA in anxiety, a scenario
such as this does seem plausible.
However, IU could be operating separately to threat appraisals, therefore it seems important to
consider which construct (IU or TA) leads to more anxiety in specific situations, including
whether there are situations where individuals are unable to identify negative or catastrophic
outcomes, but still are distressed or impaired by their feelings. This may be evident in OCD where
a significant sub-group of clients report seeking a ‘just-right’ feeling and are very distressed
without it. Does this group experience high IU but are lower on evaluation of threat appraisal,
which would imply an additional component to the TA equation is present? Additionally, in
GAD it may be that high IU is present but that again individuals are unable to identify negative
outcomes as a result of threat; rather it is the sensation of IU that is intolerable and aversive to
them. This is important to ascertain in order to consider where to target interventions in anxiety,
as it would suggest that exposure and response prevention (ERP) may not be effective for all
individuals, and that a different target around IU might be more helpful.
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Treatment studies incorporating intolerance of uncertainty
There are a small number of treatment studies which have looked at IU as a focus of intervention,
most of which have concentrated on GAD. A study examining CBT for worry utilizing the IU
model of GAD demonstrated changes in IU preceded or co-occurred with changes in worry,
which evidences further the central role of IU in anxiety (Dugas and Ladouceur, 2000).
Similar findings have been demonstrated in CBT for illness anxiety that focus on the IU
component (Langlois and Ladouceur, 2004). Furthermore, a small number of CBT outcome
studies which have used transdiagnostic treatments of anxiety have found that changes in IU
predict outcome in levels of anxiety, although IU was not specifically targeted in these therapy
protocols (Boswell et al., 2013; McEvoy and Ercer-Hurn, 2016). This supports the suggestion that
IU is a transdiagnostic cognitive behavioural process, contributing to a range of anxiety
treatments. Although the above evidence suggests that IU may be key in the treatment of anxiety
there are few treatment studies specifically aimed at treating IU, therefore further evaluation of the
treatment of anxiety targeting IU is required.
In summary, there is now considerable research to suggest that IU is an independent construct
that contributes to anxiety. Research has evidenced that IU plays a core role in the cognitive model
of GAD (Dugas et al., 1998), a proposition that has been supported by research on worry
(e.g. Dugas et al., 1997; Ladouceur et al., 2000). Studies also evidenced that the manifestation
of higher levels of uncertainty guides processing and contributes to a wide range of anxiety
difficulties (e.g. Koerner and Dugas, 2008). Nonetheless, the mechanisms through which IU
may have an impact on anxiety symptoms remain unclear, although there is a suggestion that
IU underpins concerning appraisals of uncertain situations, which may explain why people high
in IU have been shown to react more negatively to uncertain anxiety-provoking situations than
those low in IU. The impact of situational uncertainty on anxiety symptoms appears to be superior
in explaining levels of anxiety symptoms in comparison with dispositional levels of IU (Mahoney
and McEvoy, 2012a). However, as most studies have not clearly distinguished uncertain situations
from ambiguous ones, the extent these findings can be attributed to IU is limited. IU may be
considered an important mechanism for intervention in anxiety, and treatment outcome studies
reflect this as levels of IU have been shown to correspond to levels of symptom changes. However,
in order to demonstrate causality, further experimental studies using a broader range of
tasks across relevant anxiety situations are required to establish this link with anxiety beyond
correlational evidence and novel experimental tasks.
Discussion
From a very early stage in their development, cognitive models of anxiety have considered threat
appraisal to play a key role in the development and maintenance of anxiety, and a substantial body
of empirical evidence supports this proposition. It has also long been known that individuals are
more likely to appraise threat more highly or to identify situations as more threatening when they
occur within conditions of ambiguity. Despite this, it was not until relatively recently that the
potential impact of the conditions of uncertainty were specifically considered and conceptualized
with respect to the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. The construct of IU is
likely to be an important addition to our understanding of anxiety, given the close relationship
between the constructs. However, relatively little attention has been paid to specifically
disentangling the relationship between threat appraisal and uncertainty within the context of
anxiety. This has important implications in terms of developing models and hence treatment
approaches to anxiety. Although there are well-established methods of clinically working with
individuals to help them re-appraise inflated threat appraisals (e.g. behavioural experiments),
as yet there are limited numbers of treatment studies that focus on targeting or re-appraising
IU in order to explore the subsequent impact on anxiety levels.
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The influential threat appraisal framework of Carr (1974) and Salkovskis (1996) has been
important throughout our understanding of anxiety. However, the few studies which have tested
the equation experimentally have been able to demonstrate a clear role for the individual elements
of threat appraisal (probability and cost) in anxiety. A few studies have highlighted the potential
importance of including the multiplicative relationship or interaction component between
appraisal of the probability and costs of future negative events in predicting level of anxiety
(e.g. Freeston et al., 1994). The reviewed studies provide sufficient evidence to support the
relevance of threat appraisal in anxiety. By contrast, other important potential components of
the framework – the processes of coping, and perceived efficacy to cope in the face of a potential
threatening outcome – have attracted much less attention in the literature although they draw on a
strong tradition in transactional stress models. Although clinically highly intuitive, there is
relatively little experimental evidence to support the proposal that beliefs about coping are likely
to contribute to overall threat appraisal, and it is currently unclear how beliefs about coping may
interact with other variables of threat appraisal. Further investigation is required to better
understand this element of the threat appraisal framework and how it may interact with the other
components.
The dominant cognitive models and frameworks used to understand and treat anxiety
(e.g. Clark and Beck, 2010) explicitly state a central role for threat appraisal processes in the
understanding of anxiety. In relation to IU, an explicit role for this construct within anxiety
was initially confined to worry and GAD. IU has been shown to have a central and substantial
relationship with worry, and hence is a key component in a cognitive model and treatment
for GAD (Dugas et al., 1998, 2001). However, more recent evidence suggests that IU may be a
significant cognitive vulnerability factor for the development and maintenance of anxiety more
transdiagnostically (e.g. Gentes and Ruscio, 2011; Mahoney and McEvoy, 2012a). The literature
has suggested mechanisms through which IU may operate, although our understanding of these
processes remains less well developed than that of the process of threat appraisal. Some research
has demonstrated that there is an increase in threat appraisal where uncertain outcomes are
indicated and where ambiguous stimuli are identified (Dugas et al., 2005; Koerner and Dugas,
2008; Mahoney and McEvoy, 2012a). This raised the question about how IU may differ from
threat appraisal, or, indeed, whether IU may interact with threat in anxiety.
A body of evidence suggests that in the face of uncertainty, individuals who are intolerant of
this may interpret ambiguous situations as concerning, aversive and distressing, and that this may
lead to elevated TA. Thus, an individual’s capacity to tolerate uncertainty may influence how they
appraise threat in uncertain situations. Recent research has examined the role IU may play in
anxiety (Mahoney andMcEvoy, 2012b), and findings suggest that IUmay operate as a lower-order
construct mediating anxiety symptoms through higher-order factors. Although the exact nature
and mechanisms by which IU may operate in anxiety remains somewhat imprecise, a small
number of studies have found evidence to suggest that IU is an independent construct outwith
other fundamental fears such as anxiety sensitivity (Carleton et al., 2014).
Although IU is believed to be an independent construct, the extent to which uncertainty is
distinct from threat appraisal in anxiety remains unclear. This is in part because of a lack of clear
theoretical articulation of the links between them, and in part due to the current absence of
research that has explored the relationship between these constructs. One of the mechanisms most
strongly suggested currently is that IU may mediate symptoms through a vulnerability to
experience uncertainty as intolerable, and to find this unpleasant, which perhaps increases the
appraisal of threat. M. Ford (unpublished doctoral thesis, 2011) suggested that dispositional
IU is significantly associated with negative appraisal of affect and arousal in response to uncertain
situations, and this may be independent of threat appraisal. This has not yet been empirically
tested, but given Ford’s findings and the suggestion that uncertainty is threatening in itself,
it is hypothesized that appraisals of uncertainty and intolerance to these may underlie and
potentially exacerbate higher estimates of TA. From the current threat appraisal framework
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and related evidence there is no suggestion of a relationship between the established threat
components and IU.
In terms of future attempts to clarify and disentangle the relationship between IU and TA in
anxiety, it may be worth considering the use of situation-based measures of IU on
situation-specific anxiety in order to examine whether IU may be independent of TA, or whether
IU may interact with TA components. Further clarity on the nature of the relationship between
these concepts in relation to anxiety could be achieved through the use of semi-idiosyncratic
methodologies which have the specificity to simultaneously tap into the aspects of each construct
and measure their contribution separately (and interactively) to anxiety.
This review employed a non-standardized methodology, utilizing a narrative review method
coupled with systematic extraction and summarizing of the data. This method allowed for the
broad area of literature around IU and TA to be summarized and critiqued in order to draw some
conclusions. However, this methodology was not protocol-driven and the risk of subjective bias is
acknowledged as a limitation of this study.
Finally, CBT focuses on unhelpful or dysfunctional beliefs and behaviours linked with potential
negative outcomes (threat) and seeks to treat anxiety through a range of methods that modify or
challenge the processes influencing the appraisals (Clark and Beck, 2010). Consistent with
the cognitive models, current treatment approaches give a primary focus to working on the
individuals’ threat appraisals (Andrews et al., 2003). However, the reviewed evidence regarding
IU (e.g. M. Ford, unpublished doctoral thesis; Mahoney and McEvoy, 2012a) suggests it may also
be important to learn to tolerate uncertainty, as IU impacts on the experience of anxiety. A clearer
understanding of the relationship between the constructs and the role of IU separately to threat
appraisal is important in furthering the specificity of cognitive models, and potentially leading to
more effective interventions. Transdiagnostic CBT for anxiety has shown that changes in IU
predict outcome, even when IU is not directly targeted through treatment. This suggests that
IU is an important contributing mechanism in anxiety (e.g. Boswell et al., 2013).
Clinical implications
The data reviewed suggests there may be limitations with the widely accepted CBT threat appraisal
conceptualization of anxiety. Pepperdine et al. (2018) demonstrated that individuals who are
bothered by the experience of IU find it aversive even in positive situations absent of a negative
outcome. It appears that for some people an uncomfortable and unpleasant response is felt in the
presence of uncertainty with the absence of any identifiable threat, which is contrary to the current
threat model of anxiety widely described in CBT models. Clinically, this means that it is important
to consider the tendency for anxiety to be associated with greater uncertainty and to be curious
about the contribution of IU in anxiety alongside and possibly separately to threat appraisals.
Current CBT interventions for anxiety such as behavioural experiments suggest that threat
elements are targeted to support a client in re-evaluating their over-estimation of threat elements,
with the aim of changing their unhelpful beliefs and subsequently their anxiety. Certainly the data
reviewed suggested that there is extensive support for the role of threat appraisal components
(probability and cost) in anxiety, and there is some evidence that the interaction between these
components may better account for presenting levels of anxiety (e.g. Freeston et al., 1994).
However, we know that clinically where clients are facing anxiety-provoking situations this leads
to a high level of affect and often some use of safety behaviours to avoid the situation at some level
which may get in the way of effective re-appraisal. Clearly it is understandable that people wish
to avoid threat and threatening situations. The studies reviewed suggest that targeting IU and
learning to tolerate uncertainty may assist with lowering overall threat estimations and
this may be an initial target of treatment. Where IU may exist independent of threat, specific
experiments targeted at IU are likely to be most helpful.
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It is important to gain further understanding as to where IU is located in relation to threat
appraisal in anxiety, in order to extend our current conceptualization of the threat appraisal
framework and to incorporate IU appropriately. Future research which examines the individual
and interactional contributions of threat components and IU in anxiety-provoking situations
would assist with further understanding of the relationship between these components. This
should contribute to our understanding of the development and maintenance of anxiety, and
enable us to design potentially more targeted and hence effective treatment approaches for
anxiety.
Acknowledgements. This study was conducted by the first author under the supervision of the second and third authors in
part fulfilment of the Doctorate of Clinical Psychology.
Financial support. This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sector.
Conflicts of interest. The authors of this paper have no conflicts of interest with respect to this publication.
Ethical statement. The authors have abided by the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct as set out by the
APA. Ethical approval was granted by Newcastle University’s Faculty of Medical Sciences Ethics Committee (reference 00852/
2015).
Key practice points
(1) The reviewed literature provides sufficient support of the relevance of threat appraisal in anxiety.
(2) Specifically, there is extensive support for the role of threat appraisal components (probability× cost) in anxiety;
there is some evidence that the interaction between these components may better account for presenting levels of
anxiety.
(3) The evidence suggests that is a significant cognitive vulnerability factor for the development and maintenance of
anxiety.
(4) The reviewed studies found that for some an uncomfortable and unpleasant response is felt in the present of
uncertainty with the absence of any identifiable threat, which is contrary to the current threat model of anxiety
widely described in CBT models. This evidence suggests that learning to tolerate uncertainty may assist with
lowering threat estimations.
(5) The extent to which uncertainty is distinct from threat appraisal in anxiety remains unclear, partly due to the
lack of clear theoretical articulation of the links between TA and IU and in part due to the absence of research to
explore the relationship between these constructs.
Further reading
A chapter on ‘Intolerance of Uncertainty’ in the book Overcoming Worry by Kevin Meares and Mark Freeston, Basic Books
Publisher.
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